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Identifying Post-Silicon Bugs and Their Root Causes Through a
Hardware Introspection Engine
Daniel Ruiz Santa Maria, M.S.E.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017
Supervisor: Mohit Tiwari
The goal of this project is to design, build, and evaluate new hardware mechanisms
to debug post-silicon bugs in Systems-on-Chip (SoCs). Specically, we aim to accelerate the
diagnosis of complex bugs such as deadlocks that are notoriously hard to identify using exist-
ing debugging mechanisms such as ARM CoreSight and hardware performance counters. We
will design and evaluate programmable introspection mechanisms that will analyze streams
of program and hardware-level trace data at test- and run-time, check correctness invariants,
and generate event summaries that point to root causes of bugs.
This thesis describes an on-chip hardware introspection engine (HIE) that detects
anomalous transactions and alerts the user of potential bugs that could lead to deadlock.
The HIE is a device that attaches to a bus and snoops on request and response transactions
and collects response latency metadata for the transactions it receives. From this meta-
data, HIE is able to evaluate the normal behavior of transactions and alert engineers when
anomalous behavior is detected at run-time. The HIE also separates the metadata it collects
for different address ranges, creating a local version of the memory map that allows easy
integration into existing systems. Synthesis on a FPGA and simulation of the HIE show
that minimal area overhead is required for implementation and 100% detection accuracy
is achievable for deadlock scenarios. The concept of learning address ranges and collecting
and analyzing metadata for these ranges can have many applications in different fields that
leverage anomaly detection, i.e. security, debug, etc.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Hardware-level bugs that manifest after synthesis are extremely challenging to detect
and replicate. Determining the root cause of such bugs is even harder – for example, a typical
post-synthesis bug can take a few hours to manifest and require over a month of effort to
diagnose its root cause. This project aims to detect post-synthesis bugs quickly after they
manifest in order to provide better diagnostic root-cause information.
Post-synthesis bugs are challenging to diagnose because they often have long depen-
dency chains that were not explored in pre-fabrication testing and validation. For example,
a data corruption in a cache can flow through the program, get loaded into the address
register or the program counter, and lead to an illegal memory address or instruction value.
As a result, the processor or state machine logic will output illegal bus-level transactions and
cause some parts of the SoC to be deadlocked. By the time the actual error manifests, the
program may have processed millions of instructions and the corrupted data may have been
overwritten by a subsequent store instruction. Using ARM CoreSight, a designer can try to
re-run the program and if the bug is reproducible, then try to analyze the extremely large
volumes of data and use manual insight to identify the root cause. However, most of the
challenging bugs are not reproducible in a deterministic manner and collecting hardware-
level logs or running simulations until the bug manifests can take far too much memory and
time.
We present a hardware introspection engine (HIE) – a hardware unit that is attached
to the interconnect, snoops on all bus transactions among devices attached to the bus, and
populates a trace buffer with transaction information that its logic identifies as anomalous.
The HIE has multiple attributes that make it useful for debug and easy to deploy in a
practical SoC. These attributes are listed below:
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• HIE is an IP that connects to the bus and snoops on all transactions – as a result,
using the HIE does not require all existing IP to be modified and limits debugging
functionality to a small, bus standard compliant IP to be added to the SoC. This
makes HIE practical to deploy.
• HIE uses statistics from transaction history to learn non-buggy behaviors of the SoC
traffic – as a result, other IP in the system can be designed without interfacing with
the HIE design team. Once the SoC components are synthesized and fabricated, post-
synthesis test vectors can be used to generate the baseline inputs to train the HIE’s
anomaly detection mechanisms. When a bug occurs, the HIE will detect anomalies in
bus traffic, record the source-destination-messages that are potentially relevant to the
anomaly, and record these messages to a trace buffer that the debug engineer can read
out.
• HIE adds little to no overhead to existing bus protocols or system flows. By learning
the normal behavior of SoC traffic, HIE requires no programming from the host, and
can begin learning SoC behavior after reset. Another benefit of learning SoC behavior
instead of being programmed is that human error is avoided in the HIE.
In this thesis, an HIE device that detects potential deadlock transactions is emulated
in Python with Gem5 traces and then realized on an FPGA inside a Freedom SoC. Gem5
is used to create trace data by running four SPEC2006 benchmarks and the Linux boot
sequence itself to create normal transaction behavior for the HIE to learn on. The simulator
is then injected with two deadlock scenarios (an invalid address transaction and a deadlocked
peripheral device) to create a buggy trace that is later used in conjunction with the clean
traces to evaluate the Python HIE model for accuracy and functionality.
The HIE design is then converted into RTL using Chisel HDL, integrated into a
multicore RISCV SoC, and synthesized onto a Xilinx Ultrascale FPGA. The SoC is injected
with a deadlocked peripheral device bug and Linux boot is ran to feed the HIE with clean
transactions. The final design of the HIE shows 100% detection accuracy for all deadlock
scenarios and adds an overhead of 17% more LUTs and 1% more Block RAMs to a SoC
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with two out-of-order cores that have 32KB instruction and data caches (104245 LUTS, 137
Block RAMs).
The rest of this thesis is laid out as follows. Section 2 will discuss the motivation
behind this project and Section 3 will explain our proposed solution. The testing environment
will be explained in Section 4 and the results of simulation are explained in Section 5. Section
6 elaborates on hardware requirements and results of the HIE and Section 7 concludes this
thesis.
3
Chapter 2
Motivation: Post-Silicon Bugs and Existing Solutions
In this section, we categorize the most significant categories of post-silicon bugs and
focus in on the bugs we specifically target. In practice, post-silicon hardware lockups can be
classified as ‘livelocks’ or ‘deadlocks’. Livelocks can be detected by software or can be easily
fixed using existing debugger tools – software being available as a debugging option is crucial
to solving livelocks. On the other hand, deadlocks caused by hardware design bugs do not
allow engineers to use the core debug logic that is used commonly for software debugging.
In this research, we focus on developing an IP to detect deadlocks – our target is finding
the deadlock condition earlier and even finding main cause if possible. As a side effect, since
anomaly detection is a general-purpose primitive, the system can be updated with new IP
cores and the HIE will adapt its parameters to the new system.
2.1 Deadlock Scenarios
We classified deadlock scenarios into five cases based on the location of the cause.
1. Core bug. If a bug inside of the core causes deadlock, it is almost impossible
to find the main cause from an SoC debug tool. Most CPU designs have their own debug
feature that will help in system debug, but we are not going to handle core deadlocks in this
research.
2. Load/Store unit bug. There are many transaction ordering conditions applied
to the load and store units in each core – such as barriers, ordered transactions, hazard
conditions, etc. Since bugs inside the host core cannot be found by SOC debug tools, these
bugs are not targeted in this research.
3. Transaction missing due to incomplete address mapping in SOC. This is the most
common design bug that causes system lockup. Each IP designer usually only focus on
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their own dedicated address space, causing some address ranges to be left unhandled. These
address ranges usually dont create problems if software works correctly or hardware doesnt
make an unexpected transaction. When either of these happen, however, this bug becomes
a difficult one to identify and pin-point the root cause for. Figure 2.1 shows an example of
a request ignored by the bus arbiter. RAM is mapped to the address range 0x4000-0xFFFF
and a peripheral device (PERI) is mapped to 0x0000-0x1FFF. If the CPU sends a request
to address 0x3000, the arbiter will have no destination to send the transaction and will most
likely drop the request. The CPU will not receive a response and will halt the progress of
the executing program if a later instruction is dependent on the deadlocked transaction.
Figure 2.1: Deadlock caused by incomplete address mapping
4. Clock or power control logic bugs. The wrong sequence of clock or power control
requests can cause system lockup as well. This could be caused by a missing signal or protocol
handling error by software or hardware. Figure 2.2 shows a diagram of transactions sent out
by the CPU during a clock gating sequence and a peripheral device does not respond to a
request. There is a chance that the CPU sends clock gating requests out of order and the
device stops responding because it entered a clock gated state sooner than expected. This
phenomenon is almost the same as the incomplete address mapping case, but it is harder
to find the root cause because it is difficult to reproduce cases that occur sporadically in
executions with multiple masters.
5. Bus design error. Bus components themselves usually dont cause any problem,
but bridges (especially an asynchronous bridge crossing), up or down sizers, and all other
components which connect different types of devices are vulnerable to design bugs. For
example, data is missed at an asynchronous crossing in specific timing corner cases, or an
5
Figure 2.2: Deadlock caused by SoC
up or down sizer chops or merges data and the data size is no longer supported by other bus
components.
This research covers the third and fourth scenarios where an unmapped address is
accessed and a peripheral device does not respond to a request. The bus design error was
not successfully integrated into the testing environment and was not covered in this research.
2.2 Existing Solutions
The inability to access internal signals inside an SoC limits the controllability and
observability of logic to debug engineers. The most common design-for-debug (DfD) tech-
niques are JTAG and embedded logic analyzers. JTAG is an IEEE standardized hardware
interface that allows engineers to write and read flip-flop values in the internal logic of a
circuit. This gives validation engineers the ability to initialize the state of a circuit, clock
the circuit for one or more cycles with the initialized values, and then view the values of the
flops in the circuit to analyze the behavior. JTAG is useful in sensitizing paths when a bug
is reproducible, but when a bug occurs non-deterministically JTAG is not capable of storing
the events that lead to the bug. Embedded logic analyzers (ELAs) provide a solution to
the limitations of JTAG by storing a restricted group of signals before and after an event
in embedded memory [1], but they are limited by the amount of data they can hold [9].
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The combination of JTAG and ELAs increase the speed of bug diagnosis, but both of these
techniques are still limited by the bandwidth they can drive off-chip.
Industry tools have evolved to allow engineers to have more observability when they
debug SoCs. ARM Coresight, Xilinx Chipscope, and Intel Trace Hub are a few of the leading
tools that allow the user to set a trigger event and capture various signals for debug. These
tools add to JTAG and ELAs by giving the engineer the ability to reconfigure which signals
are available for debug. Although these tools are very useful and have significantly helped
in faster bug diagnosis, the increasing complexity of SoCs adds an overwhelming amount of
data that engineers have to process manually.
Singerman et al. [10] and DeOrio et al. [5] propose using pre-silicon methodologies
to better assist post-silicon debug. By using the observability of pre-silicon simulations, a
database is created off-chip that stores transactions and events that occur in various scenarios
in the design. Debug circuitry is inserted on-chip to capture the data that represents all the
events that can take place. DeOrio et al. also claim that by having very specialized hardware,
reproducing a bug is not required because most of the previous events are stored for the
engineer to observe in the design. The results of these two designs are very promising and can
greatly improve time-to-market by using pre-silicon observability to collect data on-chip that
allows engineers to have a higher level of abstraction when debugging, but they can be limited
by re-usability. Unless next generation products have only incremental changes, maintaining
the on-chip circuitry and transaction databases will require development overhead that could
actually the delay the product release. This is a trade-off that must be considered by SoC
architects.
2.3 Opportunities for HIE
HIE provides a solution that learns the behavior of a SoC on-chip and provides trans-
action history to the debug engineer. HIE does not provide a self-contained solution to
post-silicon debug, but when combined with existing DfD techniques, it can provide valu-
able insight to post-silicon engineers. The re-usability of HIE is only limited by the protocol
interface of the bus it is attached to.
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Chapter 3
Architecture of HIE
The HIE is an IP Core that attaches to the system interconnect using standard
interfaces (AXI or Tilelink protocols). As a result, no other IP core in an SoC needs to
be modified in order to be monitored by the HIE. Interestingly, ARM-based SoC tracing
solutions today enable designers to get visibility into runtime executions. However, these
solutions require the engineer to collect and process the trace data manually. Instead, HIE
includes the logic required to process these traces at runtime and then creates warnings/alerts
for the debuggers during post-silicon validation.
The HIE architecture consists of three modules called the Transaction buffer (XB),
Range Entry Table (RET), and Trace Buffer (TB). Figure 3.1 shows a top level diagram of
the HIE. These three components work together to learn the behavior of the transactions by
matching responses with request, analyzing the response times of the new transactions with
past behavior, and storing anomalous transactions for the engineer to debug. The following
sections go into further detail about each module in the HIE.
3.1 Transaction Buffer
The Transaction Buffer (XB) is tasked with tracking the response time of each trans-
action. This block gets populated with requests and counts the number of cycles it takes to
receive a response. After a response is matched with its request, the response is checked to
see if it was sent with a response error. A transaction with a response error is sent to the
Trace Buffer and not to the RET because a bad response could potentially skew the response
times the RET is tracking, i.e. a response is received faster than usual because it was sent
with an error. If the response does not have an error, the data stored in the XB is sent to
the RET for response time analysis. Any anomalous behavior detected after a request is
8
Figure 3.1: Top Level Diagram of the HIE
matched with a response is handled by the RET.
There is a chance that a request does not get a response back. Since the XB has
limited space, requests that dont receive a response after a certain amount of time need to
be removed. A parameterizable timeout value is used to invalidate entries in the XB once
the counters reach this value. Once a request has timed out it will be added to the trace
buffer as an anomalous transaction and the entry will be invalidated. Chapter 6 will discuss
the timeout values chosen and the size of the XB. In the case that a request is matched at
the same time it reaches the timeout value, the data will be forwarded to the RET instead
of the TB. This is required because the TB will stop collecting transactions if a timeout is
detected. Section 3.3 will explain the halting of trace data in more detail.
3.2 Range Entry Table
The RET is a special type of cache where each entry holds metadata (response time
statistics) for the address range that it represents. This structure is similar to the Range
Cache in [11] where special operations like insert, split and merge modify the data held in
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the table. The purpose of storing address ranges instead of point addresses is to try and
learn the memory map of the SOC. The HIE needs to differentiate transactions targeting
devices with slow response times from transactions that target devices with slow response
times in order to to not flag every transaction sent to slow responding devices as anomalous.
For example, if most transactions are routed to a DRAM controller and few transactions
are routed to a USB device, the HIE should know that USB transactions take longer to
respond than main memory transactions and are therefore behaving normally. This can be
accomplished by storing response statistics for an address range as they are seen over time.
We chose to have the HIE learn the memory map instead of being programmed with
the address space of different devices in order to provide an IP that has minimal overhead
when incorporated into an existing system. This makes the HIE a simple plug and play
device that makes no intrusion to existing flows in current and future SoCs. The HIE will
also be free of programming error if it learns the memory map instead of being configured. If
an engineer makes a mistake in the programming of the memory map, the HIE would learn
on a bad memory map and would be useless for debug.
The RET tracks the response time averages of the different address ranges it detects.
The HIE IP is placed at the outer boundary of the CPU, so the only commands tracked by
the RET are read, write, and miscellaneous commands, where miscellaneous commands are
anything other than the read and write opcodes. Therefore, each entry in the RET holds
the average response time for three different categories of commands as well as a minimum
variance for each category. Response time variance is necessary when a device can have
variable response times due to events such as queueing latency or resource congestion. The
RET must also have the most up-to-date response times to make accurate decisions with
each transaction. Dynamic frequency scaling can change the response time of a device,
so all of the commands are updated periodically by keeping a running sum of response
times and response time variance. The Implementation section describes how the update is
accomplished.
When the RET receives a transaction, it looks for the address of the transaction in
its entries. There should be no overlap in the entries of the RET so the lookup will match
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with one entry (hit) or no entries (miss). The RET handles adding, updating, and removing
entries with the special operations insert, update, split, merge, and evict. If the lookup results
in a miss, then the insert operation adds the transaction data into the RET. If the result
is a hit, then the RET will either update the entry that matched or it will split the entry
into two entries with different statistics. When the RET becomes full, the merge and evict
operations create space for future transactions. The following sections go into further detail
for each operation.
3.2.1 Insert
The insert operation occurs when there is a RET miss. An entry is created that
starts at the 4KB page of the transaction address and ends at the largest address possible
in a 48-bit address space. For example, if the first transaction the HIE sees is for address
0x0000 0000 0100, then the insert operation will create an entry with a start address of
0x0 0000 0000 (top 36 bits of the address) and an end address of 0xFFFF FFFF FFFF. The
read/write/misc averages and variances are initialized to a parameterizable value on entry
creation, and the current transaction response time overwrites the initial value for its corre-
sponding command. Initial values are needed because the RET would become fragmented
very quickly if the average and variance fields are initialized to 0. Figure 3.2 shows an
example of this fragmentation. When a read response for address 0x8000 0000 arrives, an
entry is created ranging from 0x8000 0000 to 0xFFFF FFFF FFFF. The initial values for write
and invalidate are set to 0. When a write response matches with this range (0x8200 1000
in Figure 3.2) its response time is checked with the entry's write average to determine if
it is anomalous. Since the write average is set to zero, the HIE will determine the write
transaction to be anomalous and will split the entry into two entries because it believes the
significant difference in the write response times result in it being a different device. In
reality, the write transaction should not split because it is for the same device but the initial
value of the entry created the error in the HIE. The initial values chosen are explained in
the Parameter Evaluation section.
Evictions of addresses can cause future transactions to miss in the RET. In this case
the RET must find the largest address range possible for each new entry. A state machine
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iterates through the valid entries in the RET to find the next highest start address with
respect to the current transaction. The entries must be sorted in order to know what ranges
are present at the moment. The Implementation section will explain the logic inside this
state machine. Once the next highest address is known, an entry is created starting at the
transaction address and ends at the next highest start address - 1. By spanning as much of
the address space as possible the amount of fragmentation in the RET is kept to a minimum.
3.2.2 Update
The update operation occurs when there is a hit in the RET and the transaction’s
response time falls within the variance of the matching entry’s command. After a transaction
is matched with an entry, the difference between the response time and entry’s average is
calculated and then squared to find the magnitude of the error. This value is then added
to a field in the entry that holds the running sum of errors since the last periodic update.
The response time is also added to a field that holds the running sum of response times
since the last periodic update to calculate the current average response time. Finally, an
update counter for the specific command the transaction was for is incremented. The Imple-
mentation section will describe the logic that calculates the squared error and the periodic
update.
3.2.3 Split
If the address hits in the RET but is outside the variance of the matching entry,
then a split operation is performed. A split can be the result of a transaction taking longer
than usual due to queueing or bus congestion, or because the address is mapped to a device
that has longer access time than that of the matching entry. In either case, the entry that
resulted in a hit will be split into two entries with different average response times for that
command. The new entry created from the split starts at the current transaction address
and ends at the original end address of the entry accessed. The original entry has to end at
the page right before the new entry to avoid any overlaps. For example, if the transaction
address is 0x0 8500 0000 and hit inside the entry [0x0 0008 0000, 0x0 0008 FFFF], the split
would modify the existing entry to [0x0 0008 0000, 0x0 0008 4FFF] and create a new entry
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with a range of [0x0 0008 5000, 0x0 0008 FFFF]. This new entry is initialized the same way
an insert operation initializes an entry and is then added to the RET.
A transaction with a longer than normal response time is seen as a potential anomaly
by the HIE. If an anomaly is flagged for every transaction that causes a split, then the HIE
would create a lot of false alarms for the debug engineers. To minimize the number of false
alarms, the HIE only flags transactions that took longer than AVG ANOM MULT times the
average response time of the entry that matched. AVG ANOM MULT is a parameterizable
constant and the evaluation section explains what value was chosen for the design.
3.2.4 Merge
Merge operations are performed when the RET has reached its max capacity. Trans-
actions that took longer (or shorter) than usual to respond will cause entries to split in the
RET, but because the HIE does not know the true memory map of the SoC, it is possible
that the RET becomes full with entries that were created erroneously. These entries created
through splits will eventually converge to the same average response time as the original
entry, and therefore can be merged back into a single entry.
The first event that takes place in a merge is to sort all the entries in the RET. Once
the order of the entries is determined, the RET decides whether to merge an entry based on
three cases. The first case is if the average of one of the two entries falls within the bounds of
the other entry. The second case is if an entry has had minimal access since it was created.
This alleviates the scenario when one transaction took anomalously longer than usual to
respond and a new entry was created for it, but subsequent transactions did not target this
new entry again. Finally, if an address range has not been accessed in a long time it will be
forced to merge. These three cases are listed below with more detail.
Case 1: The two entries being evaluated for a merge are tested to see if they lie within each
other’s bounds. The bounds are calculated the same way as in the update operation where
the difference in the averages are tested to be within the variance of each entry. If the read,
write, and misc. averages fall within either of the entries' variances, the entries are merged
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into one range spanning both of the entries. The entry with the higher address range is then
invalidated in the RET.
Case 2: is necessary to reduce fragmentation in the RET. If neither of the entries fell within
each other's bounds as described in Case 1, then evictions would be necessary to create
space for new address ranges. This case is useful when a range splits due to one anomalous
transaction and the newly created entry is not hit frequently. Using the same example above
for the Split operation, the range [0x8000 0000, 0x8FFF FFFF] would split into [0x8000 0000,
0x84FF FFFF] and [0x8500 0000, 0x8FFF FFFF] if a transaction to 0x8500 0000 was seen as
anomalous. If the range [0x8500 0000, 0x8FFF FFFF] is not accessed frequently then it will
waste space and should be merged back into [0x8000 0000, 0x8FFF FFFF]. This case occurs
when the LRU counter of an entry is greater than parameter LRU THRESHOLD MIN and
if the entry has not gone through a periodic update.
Case 3: also reduces fragmentation. This case will force a merge to occur if an entry’s LRU
counter is above the parameter LRU THRESHOLD MAX. This case includes entries that
have gone through a periodic update.
After an entry is merged, it is invalidated and the next highest address range is tested
to be merged. If an entry cannot be merged then the next valid entry in the index table
is tested with its next highest address for merging. This continues until all address ranges
have been checked for merging.
3.2.5 Evict
There are times when the RET is full and none of the entries can be merged. This can
occur when all entries that have not been updated have not reached LRU THRESHOLD MIN
and all entries that are updated are below LRU THRESHOLD MAX. This leads to an evic-
tion of the least recently used entry. The RET becomes fragmented when entries are evicted
and ends up leading to more evictions. Setting the LRU thresholds to lower values minimizes
the evictions that occur over time.
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3.3 Trace Buffer
The Trace Buffer holds transaction information that was deemed anomalous and
raises an interrupt when an anomalous transaction is detected. There are three types of
anomalies that the HIE will detect: a deadlock, a significantly long or short response time,
and a response error. Deadlocks are detected when the XB counters timeout and data is sent
to the TB. When this activity occurs, the Deadlock error interrupt signal is used to signal
that a deadlock was detected. Long or short response times are detected by the RET and
forwarded to the TB for future analysis. The Delay error interrupt signal notifies the user
that this event occurred. These interrupts are raised after a transaction is loaded into the
TB. The response error transactions that the Trace Buffer receives do not raise any interrupt
flags. Since the request received a response, it will not cause deadlock and it is assumed that
the original requester will know how to react to a transaction with the error field set.
The TB also stops keeping track of transactions after the deadlock error interrupt
asserts. This prevents succeeding transactions from overwriting the anomalous transaction
that caused the deadlock. The delay error interrupt does not halt the Trace Buffer because
long response times for a few transactions might not lead to failure, and long response times
occur more frequently than deadlocks.
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Figure 3.2: Example of fragmentation due to initial values starting at zero
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Chapter 4
Implementation of HIE
This chapter describes the microarchitecture and algorithms implemented inside HIE.
4.1 Transaction Buffer Design
The XB matches responses with requests to track response times. Each transaction
is first decoded to find whether it is a request or response. Requests are added to the XB
and a counter is triggered to count the number of cycles it takes to receive a response. Each
request registered in the buffer is associated with a counter that increments at every clock
cycle to get a measurement of the response time. These counters are cleared when the valid
bit toggles from high to low and start incrementing when the valid bit is set. Responses can
be received out of order, therefore a lookup process, similar to a cache lookup, is required to
match responses with their request entries. For fast lookup times, a tag is created to match
requests with their responses. Figure 4.1 shows the fields of a XB entry and the fields that
are used to make the tag. The response opcode is used for matching to reduce the lookup
time.
Figure 4.1: Transaction Buffer Entry
When a response arrives, the fields required to create the tag are concatenated, and a
parallel search of this value is done with all entries in the buffer. When the matching request
is found the valid bit is cleared, and the tag and other transaction fields are propagated to
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the RET. If an entry’s counter reaches the TIMEOUT value, the entry is invalidated and
forwarded to the Trace Buffer. Due to the fact that the XB has two separate data paths to
the RET and TB, there is no contention if an entry times out and a response is matched in
the same cycle. In the scenario that a response is matched with a request in the same cycle
that a counter reaches the TIMEOUT value, the transaction data is sent to the RET to be
determined if it is anomalous or not. Figure 4.2 shows a microarchitecture diagram of the
Transaction Buffer.
Figure 4.2: Transaction Buffer Microarchitecture Diagram
4.2 RET Entry Description
Figure 4.3 shows all the fields in an entry. The start address and end address fields
are the values used to find a matching entry in the RET. A simple comparison of whether a
transaction address lies within these fields leads to a hit in the RET. The Read/Write/Misc.
average fields are used to track the average response times for that range. Response times can
vary due to queueing latency and resource congestion, so the variance fields create bounds
for the HIE to detect anomalies. Since we do not have unlimited memory to track the average
response times of a range over the lifetime of an application, we need to periodically update
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the average response times to have the most recent data for each range. We use the sum
fields to keep a running sum of response times and the count fields as the total number of
transactions seen since the last update. The period for updating is parameterizable and the
evaluation section explains what thresholds are best for detecting anomalies. The errsqrd
fields have a similar function as the sum fields. This is the running sum of the squared
error in response time of each transaction where the error is the difference between the range
average and the current transaction response time. In order to avoid using a multiplier to
compute the square, we use shift registers and shift the error value by log2 of the next highest
power of 2 number. For example, if the error is 30 cycles then the number thirty is shifted
left by 5 bits, creating a value close to 302. With this technique, we sacrifice accuracy in
the variance that is calculated but as the results show, this does not affect the end result.
The errsqrd field is used to update the variance at the same time the average is updated.
The valid bit is used to insert and evict data in the RET and the update field is used by
the merge operation to minimize fragmentation (further explained in the next section). ID
is used by the merge and insert operation to sort the entries in ascending order. The LRU
field increments any time the RET is accessed to create new entry or to update an existing
entry.
Figure 4.3: RET entry fields
4.3 Sorting Logic
A state machine iterates through all the entries in the RET to order the transactions
from lowest to highest. To avoid doing a O(n2) sort on the RET, N comparators and one
index table are needed for N entries in the RET, where N is the max entries the RET can
hold. The comparators are loaded with the end address of the entry being analyzed and
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the start address of all of the entries. The output of the comparators result in 1 if the end
address is larger than the start address and 0 otherwise. The result of all the comparators are
passed to an adder to sum how many entries represent a lower address range. After having
this sum, the ID of the entry is stored in the index table, where the index is the sum of the
adder minus 1. Figure 4.4 shows a brief example of sorting for merge in a 4-entry RET. The
left input to the comparators is the End Address 0x8500 0FFF and the other inputs are the
start addresses of all the other entries. Three of the four comparators will be true ,so the
output of the adder will be three. This sum is then subtracted by 1 and used as the index
to the index table.
Figure 4.4: Logic used to sort RET entries
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Chapter 5
Experimental Setup
For proof of concept and quick prototyping, the HIE was first simulated using a
python model and transaction data was generated with Gem5 [4]. Two bugs were injected
into the simulation to create the deadlock scenarios and multiple SPEC2006 benchmarks
were ran to create a wide variation of transaction data to test the HIE design. After this,
the HIE RTL was developed and integrated into the Freedom U500 SoC and tested on a
Xilinx VU190 Ultrascale FPGA. The following sections go into more detail on each of these
environments.
5.1 Gem5 Test Bed
The Gem5 simulator was used because it can model a Realview ARM platform with
up to 64 heterogeneous out-of-order cores and boot unmodified Linux using the AARCH64
(ARM 64-bit) ISA. The trace-based CPU model, event-driven memory system, and flexible
addition of peripheral devices allows for the creation of transaction data from a complex
system topology. Our simulation environment, shown in Figure 5.1, established 4 ARMv8
cores with 32K Bytes L1 Instruction Cache, and 64K Bytes L1 private data caches, and one
2M Bytes L2 shared cache. The CPU cores ran at 2Ghz and the crossbar bus clock ran at
1Ghz. All components attached to the crossbar run at the same speed as bus with some
delay. The Linux kernel used was genericarmv8 3.16.0-rc6, and the benchmark programs ran
were the SPEC2006 BZIP2, GCC, HMMR, and LibQuantum.
5.1.1 Bug Injection in Gem5
Gem5 has an event-driven memory system which includes caches, crossbars, and a
DRAM controller model. To create a scenario where an unmapped memory address is ac-
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Figure 5.1: Architecture Diagram
cessed, a pre-defined ‘non-responsive memory transaction’ is created. An address is arbitrar-
ily chosen and labeled as a ‘non-mapped-address’ to trigger the non-responsive transaction
scenario. This address is seen at the crossbar and tagged as a ‘bug’, and then forwarded to
its target destination. The slave will check the ‘bug’ tag and drop the request, skipping the
response generation. Since a master (CPU in this case) will never get a response back from
the slave, the request transaction will not be retired and the system deadlock situation is
simulated. Once the bug is manifested in the simulation, the master (CPU) that generates
the transaction will never retire the transaction, and the master will stop the execution of the
running program. However, other masters (CPU and other components) can keep generat-
ing transactions because the system bus is still functional unless they generate a transaction
that hits the bug again or make a transaction that has a hazard condition with the bug
transaction.
The second deadlock scenario simulated was a non-responsive device bug. The Uart
IP inside Gem5 is connected to the terminal (TTY device) and generates various interrupts
during simulation, so a similar infrastructure of creating a ‘non-responsive transaction’ was
used to simulate a system deadlock caused by the Uart. After a large arbitrary number
of accesses to the Uart, the Uart IP sets the bug tag in the response transaction and the
crossbar does not send the response back to the master (CPU). This bug causes the master
to go into deadlock by not allowing it to retire the bug transaction, but it also causes the
Uart to go into deadlock as well. The bug specifically targets a register inside Uart that
clears its interrupts, so the Uart will stop generating interrupts after the bug is hit because
the Uart logic believes there is a interrupt in flight for the rest of the simulation. This
creates a deadlocked core because it never receives a response as well as an IP that is no
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longer functional for the rest of the system.
5.1.2 Bus Trace Monitor
To collect transaction data from Gem5, a bus debug monitor was used to create a log
file of all the transactions sent through the crossbar. The bus monitor module was placed
between the L2 cache and the crossbar component as shown in Figure 5.2. By having the
bus monitor at this hierarchy, all device and memory transactions are captured in the trace
file. The information collected by the monitor includes the transaction opcode, address, size,
source ID, and cycle time.
Figure 5.2: Bus Monitor
5.1.3 Creating the Trace Data
The trace data was created by running both the Linux boot sequence and SPEC2006
benchmarks before encountering the bug. This allowed the HIE model to learn the behavior
of the SoC with at least 500,000 transactions to determine the bug.
The debug monitor began collecting transaction data for the Linux boot sequence
from the start of execution. If the simulation was started with the deadlock scenarios com-
piled into the simulator, the memory bug would be triggered by DMA transactions and the
system would hang before the boot sequence finished. To circumvent this issue, the Linux
boot sequence was traced without either of the deadlock scenarios and a Gem5 checkpoint
was created to save the state of the simulator after boot. Modifications can be made to
the simulator after a checkpoint is created, and the state of the simulation can be restored
from the checkpoint after the modifications are made. Once the simulation was saved in a
checkpoint, the bugs were compiled separately into the design so they would not interfere
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with each other. As a result of compiling two different binaries, the traces were different for
each bug after restoring from the checkpoint. The simulation and trace were started again
after injecting each bug, and a custom program was executed to trigger the deadlocks. The
purpose of the program was to create memory transactions through multiple memory alloca-
tion commands and eventually issue a request to the non-responsive address and trigger the
memory bug. The program was also used to trigger the deadlock scenario for the uart bug
by printing text to the terminal and generating a uart transaction every time a character
was printed to the screen. After encountering each bug, the simulator was allowed to keep
tracing transaction data for about 3ms. By not stopping the trace earlier, the scenario where
the active cores would continue their normal operation while one core was deadlocked was
simulated.
For the SPEC2006 benchmarks, the simulation started at the checkpoint after booting
Linux and the debug monitor began collecting traces from the checkpoint until the simulation
was stopped. Unlike the Linux boot sequence where the simulator had to be bug-free in order
to not create a deadlock, these benchmarks ran with each bug pre-compiled into the simulator
separately. The different binaries created with each bug created slightly different traces for
each benchmark and provided more variety of transaction information to analyze the HIE
model. After the benchmarks finished running, the custom program was executed to trigger
the bugs and create the deadlock scenarios. In the same fashion as the boot sequence, these
traces ran for approximately 3ms after hitting the bug to allow the active cores to continue
processing instructions. Chapter 6 describes the results acquired from processing the trace
data.
5.2 Freedom U500 Testing Platform
For RTL development, the Freedom U500 SoC from SiFive was selected because it is
an open source SoC design that allows for easy configuration of cache sizes, number of cores,
transaction data size, and attachment of peripheral components. Freedom U500 integrates
the Rocket-Chip generator described in [2] and has undergone full functionality testing for
academic and industry research. This SoC implements the RISCV ISA and is written in
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Chisel HDL for quick development. The RISCV-toolchain also allows conversion of Chisel to
Verilog, which allows for existing industry tools to be used for validation and testing. The
HIE RTL was written in Chisel, integrated into Freedom, and then converted to verilog to be
synthesized onto a Xilinx Ultrascale FPGA using the Vivado 2017.1 tool suite. Linux 4.6.2
was used to boot the SoC and was compiled with riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu-gcc version
6.1.0. The following sections go into further detail of the SoC design and configuration.
5.2.1 Architecture Configuration
The Freedom U500 SoC was configured to have two 64-bit Rocket cores with 32KB L1
instruction and data caches. The L2 cache has been removed by SiFive because of multiple
bugs, and it is not used in this experiment. The processors and crossbar peripherals all
run at 62.5 MHz and an asynchronous crossing is used to interface with the DDR4 memory
controller. There are three devices (Bootrom, UART, GPIO) connected to the SoC in which
one is used to generate the deadlock situation.
5.2.2 Bug Injection in Freedom SoC
A non-responsive peripheral bug was injected into the Freedom platform to create a
deadlock scenario. This bug was created by adding a counter inside the UART to count the
number of requests that are sent to the UART. A large arbitrary number of transactions was
chosen (between 1 to 2 million) before the counter triggered the deadlock. Upon seeing the
number of transactions we chose, the UART ties the valid signal for the response transactions
to zero and the last request is never retired.
5.2.3 HIE Instantiation in Freedom
Unlike Gem5, there is no global crossbar in the U500 SoC where all transactions
can be seen. The peripheral devices are connected to an MMIO crossbar and the DRAM
memory is connected to a separate crossbar. We ran experiments with the HIE connected
to the MMIO crossbar only and to both of the crossbars. By snooping at the port where
the cores connect to each of these crossbars, the HIE can keep track of all the requests that
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go out of the cores. Freedom adds Tilelink Fragmenters throughout the crossbars and these
modules take one request and split it into multiple requests. We chose to connect the HIE
at the connection of the CPU cluster to each crossbar instead of the Fragmenters to avoid
large code modification to the Freedom RTL.
5.2.4 Freedom Simulation
After synthesis and implementation, the HIE was tested on the Freedom U500 design
by booting unmodified Linux. The uart bug was synthesized into the design from the be-
ginning of boot and the print messages generated by the Linux kernel were used to generate
uart transactions. The bug was encountered after about 1.5 million uart transactions. It
was not possible to run the SPEC2006 benchmarks on the FPGA because the HIE detected
a deadlock before the Linux boot sequence finished. This could be due to a bug in the design
that was not covered during unit testing or if the SoC has a way to poll data and not expect
a response for every request, i.e. polling for an Ethernet device that does not exist.
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Chapter 6
Parameter Evaluation
As was mentioned earlier, the HIE requires the user to set parameters to get proper
functionality from the HIE. This chapter explains the exact parameter values used and the
size of the data structures in the HIE. From the trace data collected in Gem5, the parameters
in the RET were varied in the python model to find the smallest values that would capture
each bug. The graphs use a y-axis with logarithmic values because some benchmarks issued
significantly more transactions during the experiments. The raw numbers made it difficult
to visualize the data for the benchmarks that generated less transactions. All of the plots
show the results of the evictions generated for the traces with the memory bug and uart bug
injected. As was mentioned in section 5.1.3, the traces for each benchmark was different so
the results for both of the bugs were analyzed to verify that the parameters were not skewed
towards the transaction behavior of one of the bugs.
6.1 Transaction Buffer Size and Timeout Value
The Transaction Buffer is dependent on how many transactions can be in flight in a
system. If no more than 32 transactions can be in flight at a time, then a XB of size 32 is
enough for a system. Our implementation used a XB of size 64 for all of our experiments and
a timeout value of 1500 cycles. In general, the smaller the timeout value is the faster the HIE
can detect an anomaly, but setting the timeout value too small can create false positives by
evicting requests from the XB that will get a response. We found that increasing the timeout
value to more than 1500 cycles did not decrease the number of false positives produced.
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6.2 LRU THRESHOLD Values
The LRU threshold values were refined based on the periods where the HIE would
evict the most entries from the RET. At the beginning of each trace, the HIE would evict
entries with LRU fields that were greater than 3000, meaning more than 3000 transactions
had been analyzed since this entry was last hit. After about a million transactions, the HIE
became fragmented and was evicting entries with LRU fields set to around 100. To prevent
the RET from being fragmented even further, the LRU THRESHOLD MIN parameter was
varied from 25 to 100 to find the value that generated the least amount of evictions. Figure 6.1
shows the results for Linux Boot and four SPEC benchmarks for the Uart bug and Memory
bug.
Smaller thresholds force the entries to merge at a faster rate, leading to less evictions.
The final value used in our implementation was 25.
Using the minimum LRU Threshold of 25, the max threshold was tested using the
values 100, 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000. We wanted the max threshold to be significantly larger
than the minimum threshold so that the RET would not merge entries too soon after they
had split. Figure 6.2 shows the number of evictions for these values. The results were similar
to those of LRU THRESHOLD MIN where the smaller thresholds led to less evictions. The
larger values allowed infrequently used entries to occupy space in the RET that could not be
merged with the minimum threshold and had to be evicted to create space. A larger RET
can help in minimizing evictions with the tradeoff of increasing area, but to minimize the
area cost we chose the threshold of 100 for LRU THRESHOLD MAX in our design. These
values remained the same with our RTL implementation of HIE.
6.3 Update Period
Using the LRU thresholds of 25 and 100, we iterated through values between 10 and
100 to find the optimal point to update RET entry averages and variances. Figure 6.3 shows
the number of splits generated for all the benchmarks with both bugs. We compared the
number of splits produced because the HIE will split the entries too frequently if the averages
are not accurate and evictions will begin to occur. By updating the averages and variances
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Figure 6.1: Evictions produced for different LRU THRESHOLD MIN values
Figure 6.2: Evictions produced for different LRU THRESHOLD MAX values
at a faster rate, the HIE is able to learn the behavior of an address range faster and diagnose
bugs faster. In both scenarios, the shorter update periods produced slightly less splits than
longer update intervals. For this reason, we chose 10 in our final solution for the update
period. In our HIE implementation, the value 16 was used instead of 10. This allowed us
to do the division with shifting instead of having a lot of logic to division of numbers with
non-powers of 2.
6.4 Range Entry Table Size
With the optimal values for LRU thresholds and update period given above, we then
varied the size of the RET to find the smallest size that would yield the least amount of
evictions and keep as much address range data in the RET. Figure 6.4 shows the results
from this experiment. There were little to no evictions produced when the RET had more
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Figure 6.3: Splits produced for different update frequencies.
entries to use. The smaller RETs had less space to use and evicted entries when new data
was found. The tradeoff we had to consider was the amount of area the larger RETs would
require to implement with the amount of evictions that were generated. The 8-entry RET
produced too many evictions to be useful in a system so this configuration was not useful.
A 16-entry RET produced significantly less evictions than the 8-entry RET but still more
than the 24-entry RET. All the RETs of 24 entries or more produced little to no evictions,
so the 32 and 40 entry RETs were ignored and the two RET sizes left to consider were the
16 entry and the 24 entry. Our RTL implementation used the 16-entry RET because the
larger RET caused the area of the HIE to grow significantly larger. The Area Cost section
explains more on this.
Figure 6.4: Evictions produced for different RET sizes
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6.5 Initial Average and Variance
The initial values used for the Read/Write/Invalidate averages were chosen based
on the statistics of the GEM5 simulator. GEM5 tracks the average latency of transactions
sent to the crossbar and gives the average queueing latency and bus latency. By using the
average access time as the average and calculating the variance to have a range that adds
the queuing and bus latency, we were able to predict the response times of the transactions
enough to minimize split operations. We used the same parameters from Gem5 in our
Freedom implementation. Since there is no monitor on the FPGA, it is difficult to measure
response times accurately. Finding accurate measurements would entail developing hardware
that would act as a monitor and measure the response times.
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Chapter 7
Results
The following sections evaluate the implementation details (area and delay costs)
and the detection accuracy of the HIE in both the Gem5 and Freedom platforms. VCS
simulations were ran to find the delay costs and Vivado synthesis/implementation reports
were used to find the physical requirements of the HIE.
7.1 Detection Accuracy in Gem5
The HIE uses the AVG ANOM MULT parameter to label transactions that take
significantly longer than usual as anomalous, and the value of this parameter had a great
effect on the total alerts raised by the HIE. For the deadlock scenarios simulated, the HIE
had a 100% true positive rate of detecting the deadlock for parameter values of 8 to 16. No
false alarms were raised for deadlock scenarios in any of the simulations.
However, the HIE aims to alert the engineer of anomalous response behavior as well
as deadlocks, and the AVG ANOM MULT parameter had it’s largest effect on detection
accuracy when reporting anomalous response latencies. The HIE found a few transactions
that behaved anomalously during the simulations, and the rate of false positives grew signif-
icantly for smaller values of AVG ANOM MULT. Figure 7.1 plots the rate of false positives
for the values 8 through 16. Flagging anomalies only when a transaction’s response time was
greater than 16 times the address range’s average yielded the least amount of false alarms
for all of the benchmarks and a few of the traces did not generate a false positive at all. The
value of 16 filtered out almost all of the outliers in response times created from bus con-
tention and resource congestion. High values for AVG ANOM MULT limited the precision
of the anomalous behavior that was detected by the HIE, and values of 13 or higher made
the design less sensitive to response time variation. Lower values detected smaller variations
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in response times but the number of false alarms grew significantly with values below 10,
and this contradicted the goal of the HIE to mitigate the amount of data an engineer has
to analyze to speed up the debug process. In order to have the most accurate and precise
anomaly detection for all of the benchmarks, a value of 11 or 12 provided the best results.
Figure 7.1: False Positive Rate of Anomalies Flagged by HIE for Different Multiplier Values
7.2 Detection Accuracy in Freedom
As was mentioned before, the HIE was instantiated to snoop on device traffic only
and snoop on both memory and device traffic. When only device traffic was snooped, the
HIE detected the bug 100% of the time and the detection window was 1500 cycles after
the initial request occurred. The HIE halted the trace of other transactions into the Trace
Buffer, and the anomalous transaction could always be found in the Trace Buffer. When both
the memory and device crossbar traffic was input into the HIE, there was a 55% detection
accuracy of the bug during Linux Boot on the FPGA. When the bug counter was below
1.5 million transactions, the bug was almost always detected. When the counter was set to
values above 1.5 million, the HIE would register a memory transaction as a deadlock and
stop the trace of instructions before the bug was actually hit. This could be caused by the
initial parameters not being precise for the FPGA, and leading to a lot of stalls and some
responses probably being dropped because the HIE is busy processing previous transactions.
More analysis of the behavior of the memory transactions is required to avoid all of the false
positives the HIE flags.
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7.3 Hardware Requirements
The following sections describe the area cost and cycle time of implementing the HIE.
The RTL was written in Chisel and the implementation was tested on a Freedom U500 SoC
synthesized on a Xilinx Ultrascale FPGA.
7.3.1 Cycle Time
The HIE can take many cycles to process a transaction, and can lead to stalls to
process new transactions. An Insert operation takes 18 cycles because it needs to sort the
RET to find the largest range it can span and then add the range into the RET. Update and
Split operations require three cycles to finish modifying the RET. A Merge operation can
take up to 50 cycles to finish because it has to sort all the entries and then iterate through
every entry and check the averages and variances in order from lowest to highest, taking two
cycles for each entry. The Evict Operation takes 50 cycles because it is the last check done
by the Merge Operation.
The worst case scenario where the RET would be busy while new transactions are
ready to be processed is when a transaction is inserted and causes the RET to become full,
and a merge operation is triggered to make space for new ranges. This process requires 50
cycles to finish before the RET is ready to process new transactions. A 16-entry fifo was the
smallest that was able to capture the Non-responsive peripheral bug in the Freedom SoC.
7.3.2 Synthesis Report Analysis
Table 7.2 shows the RTL component breakdown of the Transaction Buffer created by
Vivado. The 16 adders are used to increment the timers for each entry. The 36-bit registers
are the Address fields in all the entries and the 13-bit registers are the Timer fields. The
8-bit registers are the Source field, the 4-bit registers are the Mask field, the 3-bit registers
are for the Size, Opcode, and Param fields, the 2-bit registers are the Cmd Type field, and
the 1-bit registers are for the Valid bit in each entry. The 11-bit register is the response
tag that is created when a response transaction is received. There are a few more registers
than the 16 that are needed for each entry and this can be attributed to boilerplate logic in
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Field Size Quantity Total
Valid 1 bit 1 1 bit
Opcode 3 bits 1 3 bits
Source 8 bits 1 8 bits
Address 36 bits 1 36 bits
Mask 4 bits 1 4 bits
Size 3 bits 1 3 bits
Param 3 bits 1 3 bits
Timer 13 bits 1 13 bits
Cmd Type 2 bits 1 2 bits
Total 73 bits
Table 7.1: Size of Transaction Buffer entry fields
the design (flops for input and output). The majority of the muxes are used to output the
data in the Transaction Buffer that has matched with a response. The two input 36, 13, 8,
4, 3, 2, and 1 bit muxes are used to select the entry data that goes to the RET or to the
Trace buffer. The 16 input 4-bit mux indexes into the highest available entry out to add
new requests. Response opcode decoding is done by the 5 input 3-bit mux and finding the
command type is done with the 6 input 2-bit mux. The 32 input mux is a valid signal that
is sent to Trace Buffer. This mux has 32 inputs instead of 64 because a timeout error or a
response error can send data to the Trace Buffer.
Table 7.3 shows the size of the fields in a RET entry for a 16-entry RET. Address
ranges are represented at the page level so Start and End Address only require 36 bits of
memory for a 48-bit address. Using these field sizes, one RET entry requires 51 bytes (407
bits) of memory. A 16-entry RET would then require a minimum of 816 bytes of memory
for implementation.
Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 show the Vivado component breakdown of the RET. The
36-bit adders are used to calculate the new start and end addresses when a Split or Insert
operation take place. 32-bit adders are used throughout the RET to increment LRUs and
the Squared Error fields, and to calculate the bounds for considering splits and merges.
Updating the running sum is done by the 2 input 13-bit adders and the 3 input 13-bit
adders compare new transactions for long anomalous response times. The 16 input 5-bit
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Component Number of Inputs Output Size Quantity
Adder 2 13 bit 16
Mux 2 36 bit 32
Mux 2 13 bit 16
Mux 2 8 bit 32
Mux 2 4 bit 32
Mux 16 4 bit 1
Mux 5 3 bit 1
Mux 2 3 bit 96
Mux 6 2 bit 1
Mux 2 2 bit 32
Mux 2 1 bit 113
Mux 16 1 bit 4
Mux 32 1 bit 2
Mux 17 1 bit 1
Register 36 bit 18
Register 13 bit 17
Register 11 bit 1
Register 8 bit 18
Register 4 bit 18
Register 3 bit 54
Register 2 bit 17
Register 1 bit 21
Table 7.2: Vivado Component Report for Transaction Buffer
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adder is used to sum the comparators for the index into the sort table, and the other 5-bit
adders are used for tracking the periodic update, iterating through all of the entries when
sorting, and subtracting 1 from the 16 input adder to have the proper bounds in the sort
table. The 4-bit adders are used for the counters in the merge operation to skip over invalid
entries.
The registers implemented are mostly all inside the RET. There are two 32-bit reg-
isters inside each RET entry (errSq, variance) for three different commands plus an LRU
counter, and there are 16 entries which yield 112 32-bit registers for all the entries. There
are two 36-bit register in every entry which comes out to 32 36-bit registers required for the
RET. There are a few more 36-bit registers implemented because they are needed for storing
the new start and end addresses when a Split or Insert is done. Each entry also has one
register to keep track of the average and sum for each command, leading to one 13-bit and
17-bit register in each entry. The 5-bit register accumulate because of the three count fields
in each entry and the 4-bit registers are used for the entry id in each entry and to store the
order of the RET in the sort table. The 1-bit registers are the valid bits and other flags used
to select data out of muxes or to choose the next state.
The synthesis tool used over 9000 muxes to implement the logic inside the RET. This
large amount of muxes is needed for all the possibilities that can occur when sorting the RET,
and then accessing the RET based on that order. The amount of branching that the state
machine has to do based on its calculations also adds to the sum of muxes. These signals
are mostly bulked in the 2-input 1-bit mux quantity. As was mentioned in the Cycle Time
section, stalls can occur in the RET logic. When the HIE was connected to the Memory and
Peripheral Buses, it required a 16-entry Queue to be able to catch the bug. The Queue data
is the inputs to stage 1 from stage 0, so each entry contains the opcode, source, address,
mask, size, param, timer, and Cmdtype for each transaction. For a 16-entry Queue, each
entry requires 72 bits, and in 16 entries, 144 bytes are needed for implementation. The
synthesis tool implemented this queue as Block RAM on the FPGA.
A 128-entry Trace Buffer was used to capture the anomalous transactions. Since
entries in the Trace Buffer had the same fields as the Transaction Buffer entry minus the
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Field Size Quantity Total
Start Address 36 bits 1 36 bits
End Address 36 bits 1 36 bits
Valid 1 bit 1 1 bit
Update 1 bit 1 1 bit
ID 4 bits 1 4 bits
LRU 32 bits 1 32 bits
Average 13 bits 3 96 bits
Variance 64 bits 3 192 bits
Sum 64 bits 3 192 bits
ErrSqrd 64 bits 3 192 bits
Count 5 bits 3 15 bits
Total 797 bits
Table 7.3: Size of RET entry fields
Component Number of Inputs Output Size Quantity
Adder 2 36 bit 2
Adder 2 32 bit 19
Adder 2 17 bit 3
Adder 3 16 bit 3
Adder 3 13 bit 3
Adder 2 13 bit 3
Adder 2 5 bit 7
Adder 16 5 bit 1
Adder 2 4 bit 1
Register 36 bit 39
Register 32 bit 116
Register 17 bit 48
Register 16 bit 48
Register 8 bit 2
Register 5 bit 52
Register 4 bit 40
Register 3 bit 7
Register 2 bit 1
Register 1 bit 39
Table 7.4: Vivado Component Report for Range Entry Table
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Component Number of Inputs Output Size Quantity
Mux 2 36 Bit 1157
Mux 2 32 Bit 418
Mux 16 32 Bit 1
Mux 2 17 Bit 465
Mux 3 17 Bit 16
Mux 2 16 Bit 464
Mux 4 16 Bit 16
Mux 2 13 Bit 515
Mux 2 5 Bit 1013
Mux 3 5 Bit 16
Mux 4 5 Bit 4
Mux 16 4 Bit 2
Mux 2 4 Bit 31
Mux 5 4 Bit 2
Mux 2 3 Bit 13
Mux 6 3 Bit 1
Mux 3 3 Bit 1
Mux 2 2 Bit 231
Mux 2 1 Bit 4578
Mux 5 1 Bit 18
Mux 16 1 Bit 2
Mux 4 1 Bit 2
Mux 15 1 Bit 1
Mux 8 1 Bit 1
Mux 7 1 Bit 1
Table 7.5: Vivado Component Report for Range Entry Table Continued
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Component Number of Inputs Output Size Quantity
RAM 4608 bit 1
RAM 1024 bit 1
RAM 512 bit 1
RAM 384 bit 3
Mux 2 36 bit 1
Mux 2 8 bit 1
Mux 2 4 bit 1
Mux 2 3 bit 3
Mux 2 1 bit 8
Table 7.6: Vivado Component Report for Trace Buffer
timer and valid fields, each entry required 8 bytes (59 bits) of storage. This means the Trace
Buffer would require a minimum of 1024 bytes of storage to be implemented. Table 7.6 shows
the Component report for the Trace Buffer implementation. JTAG was not implemented in
the design and in order to have the Vivado synthesize the Trace Buffer, the fields of each
Trace Buffer entry was output to the top level of the HIE. The muxes implemented were
used to select data from Stage 0 or Stage 2 to add to the Trace Buffer. The 4608-bit RAM
stored the Address for the 128 entries and the 1024-bit RAM saved the Source fields of the
anomalous transaction. For the Param, Size, and Opcode fields, Vivado created three 384-bit
RAMs as storage and the Mask Field was stored in the 512-bit RAM.
7.3.3 Final Implementation Results
Table 7.7 shows the FPGA resource breakdown for the entire Freedom SoC, the HIE,
and each of the components in the HIE. The HIE used 17% of the total LUTs used to
implement the design and 10% of the total registers. The areas where the HIE required
more hardware was with F7 and F8 muxes, using 36% and 79% of all the muxes respectively.
Only one tile of Block RAM was used in the HIE implementation and this was used for the
Trace Buffer.
Table 7.8 shows the resource utilization of the HIE and of one Rocket core. Each core
required about 13503 LUTs, 9693 registers, 376 carry chains, 170 F7 muxes, 34 F8 muxes,
36 Block RAM tiles, and 8 DSP slices for implementation. The total LUTs used for the
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Module CLB LUTs CLB Registers Carry8 F7 Muxes F8 Muxes Block RAM Tiles DSPs
Freedom U500 104245 77497 1692 3385 636 136.5 11
HIE 17682 (17%) 7702 (10%) 318 (19%) 1228 (36%) 505 (79%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%)
Transaction Buffer 531 703 32 0 0 0 0
Range Entry Table 16854 6954 282 1228 505 0 0
Trace Buffer 297 11 4 0 0 1 0
Table 7.7: HIE Utilization Report after Implementation
Module CLB LUTs CLB Registers Carry8 F7 Muxes F8 Muxes Block RAM Tiles DSPs
Freedom U500 104245 77497 1692 3385 636 136.5 11
Rocket Core 13503 (13%) 9693 (13%) 376 (22%) 170 (5%) 34 (5%) 36 (26%) 4 (36%)
HIE 17682 (17%) 7702 (10%) 318 (19%) 1228 (36%) 505 (79%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%)
Table 7.8: FPGA Resource Utilization for HIE and Coreplex
HIE amounted to 37% more LUTs than one single Rocket core, and the registers and carry
chains were fewer but comparable. The most significant difference was the amount of Block
RAM tiles required for implementation. One core needed 36 block RAM tiles while the HIE
used only one. Each Block RAM tile in the Xilinx Virtex Ultrascale architecture has 36Kb
of data storage [7] and this considerably increases the area of the core. In summary, the
HIE uses 37% more logic than a single core, but only needs 3% of the total storage, making
the HIE small and deployable in an SoC if the size of SRAM is larger than that of standard
cells.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Conclusion
The existing solutions for post-silicon bug diagnosis require the debug engineer to
manually dissect the data collected through debug tools in order to find the root cause of a
bug. As SoCs add more cores (masters) and devices, the manual analysis of debug data will
increase the time to diagnose a bug and increase a product’s time to market. The HIE design
presented in this thesis presents a solution that will provide faster bug diagnosis by learning
the response times of transaction data on-chip and flagging anomalous transaction behavior
before trace data can be overwritten by the progress of different masters. By only having
to adhere to the protocol behavior of the interconnect, the HIE has quick development time
and adds little overhead to the design phase of a product.
The HIE is a step in the right direction to provide an on-chip debug solution that
can streamline the debug effort for engineers working on post-silicon products. This current
design adds a significant area overhead to the SoC, but there is room for improvement by
changing the logic and using different components for implementation. If HIE can be de-
ployed into an existing system and allow engineers to have a real-time diagnosis to deadlocks
and other bugs, time to market can be greatly reduced and products can be sold faster. With
the help of HIE, heterogenous SoCs can continue to grow in complexity, and either maintain
or reduce the design effort of current SoCs.
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